The paper studies a system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations, arising from a stochastic optimal debt management problem in an infinite time horizon with exponential discount, modeled as a noncooperative interaction between a borrower and a pool of risk-neutral lenders. In this model, the borrower is a sovereign state that can decide how much to devaluate its currency and which fraction of its income should be used to repay the debt. Moreover, the borrower has the possibility of going bankrupt at a random time and must declare bankruptcy if the debt reaches a threshold x * . When bankruptcy occurs, the lenders only recover a fraction of their capital. To offset the possible loss of part of their investment, the lenders buy bonds at a discounted price which is not given a priori. This leads to a nonstandard optimal control problem. We establish an existence result of solutions to this system and in turn recover optimal feedback payment strategy u * (x) and currency devaluation v * (x). In addition, the behavior of (u * , v * ) near 0 and x * is studied.
Introduction
Consider a system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations
motivated by a stochastic optimal debt management problem in infinite time horizon with exponential discount, modeled as a noncooperative interaction between a borrower and a pool of risk-neutral lenders. Here, the independent variable x is the debt-to-income ratio and V is the value function for the borrower who is a sovereign state that can decide the devaluation rate of its currency v and the fraction of its income u which is used to repay the debt. The borrower has a possibility to go bankrupt with an instantaneous bankruptcy risk ρ, and must declare bankruptcy when the debt-to-income ratio reaches a threshold x * > 0. The salvage function θ determines the fraction of capital that can be recovered by lenders when bankruptcy occurs.
To offset the possible loss of part of their investment, the lenders buy bonds at a discounted rate p which is not given a priori. Rather, it is determined by the expected evolution of the debt-to-income ratio at all future times. Hence it depends globally on the entire feedback controls u and v. This leads to a highly nonstandard optimal control problem, and a "solution" must be understood as a Nash equilibrium, where the strategy implemented by the borrower represents the best reply to the strategy adopted by the lenders, and conversely.
In the economics literature, some related models of debt and bankruptcy, with a focus on mathematical analysis, can be found in [2, 3, 4, 6, 7] . In [4] , the borrower has a fixed income and large values of the debt determine a bankruptcy risk, adding uncertainty to the model. In [7] , a numerical analysis was performed of a similar model in which the uncertainty comes not from bankruptcy risk but the random evolution of the borrower's income. An analytical study of a slight variant of the model was performed in [3] where no currency devaluation is available to the government. The authors constructed optimal feedback solutions in the stochastic case and provided an explicit formula for the optimal strategy in the deterministic case. Moreover, their analysis also shows how the expected total cost of servicing the total debt together with the bankruptcy cost is affected by different choices of x * . Interestingly, under a natural assumption, the possibility of a "Ponzi scheme", where the old debt is serviced by initiating more and more new loans, can be ruled out. This study is continued by adding the option for currency devaluation in [6] . Recently, a stochastic model with no currency devaluation but with uncertainty coming from bankruptcy risk was analyzed in [2] .
The present paper aims to provide a detailed mathematical analysis of a more general model of debt and bankruptcy. When the currency devaluation is not an option for the borrower (v ≡ 0), or the bankruptcy risk
our model reduces to the one analyzed in [2] or [6] , respectively. We establish an existence result for the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations (1.1). In turn, this yields the existence of a pair of optimal feedback controls (u * , v * ) which minimizes the expected cost to the borrower. More precisely, let L : [0, 1[→ [0, +∞[ be the cost for the borrower to implement the control strategy u(·) and let c : [0, v max [→ [0, +∞[ be a social cost resulting by devaluation, i.e., the increasing cost of the welfare and of the imported goods. We show that
• given the debt-to-income ratio threshold x * and the bankruptcy risk function ρ with lim x→x * − ρ(x) = +∞, if L and c are strictly convex then the system (1.1) admits a
This implies that an optimal feedback solution to the model of debt and bankruptcy is
Since ρ goes to +∞ as x tends to x * , the system (1.1) is not uniformly elliptic at 0 and x * .
To handle this difficulty, the classical idea is to construct solutions of approximate systems as steady states of corresponding auxiliary parabolic systems. In order to obtain a solution to the original system (1.1), we derive explicit a priori estimates on the derivatives of approximate solutions. As a consequence, the devaluation of currency is not optimal when the debt-toincome ratio x is sufficiently small. In addition, we provide lower and upper bounds for the value function V as subsolution and supersolution to the first equation of (1.1). Relying on these bounds, we show that when x is sufficiently close to x *
• if the risk of bankruptcy ρ slowly approaches to infinity as x tends to x * , i.e.,
x *
then the optimal strategy of borrower involves continuously devaluating its currency and making payment,
• conversely, if the risk of bankruptcy ρ quickly approaches to infinity infinity as x tends to x * , i.e., lim
then any action to reduce the debt is not optimal.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a more detailed description of the model and derive the equations satisfied by the value function V and the discounted bond price p. In Section 3, we begin by showing the existence of optimal controls in feedback form. We close by performing a more detailed analysis of the behavior of the optimal feedback controls near x * , under certain assumptions on the bankruptcy risk.
2 Model derivation and system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations
Model derivation
We introduce our optimal debt management problem in infinite time horizon, modeled as a noncooperative interaction between a borrower and a pool of risk-neutral lenders. Let v(t) be the devaluation rate at time t, regarded as a control. The total income Y is governed by a stochastic process
where W is a Brownian motion on a filtered probability space, σ > 0 is the volatility, and µ is the average growth rate of the economy. We denote by X(t) the total debt of a borrower, financed by issuing bonds, and
• r = the interest rate paid on bonds;
• λ = the rate at which the borrower pays back the principal.
When an investor buys a bond of unit nominal value, he will receive a continuous stream of payments with intensity (r + λ)e −λt . If no bankruptcy occurs, the payoff for an investor will thus be ∞ 0 e −rt (r + λ)e −λt dt = 1.
Otherwise, a lender recovers only a fraction θ ∈ [0, 1] of his outstanding capital which depends on the total amount of debt at the time on bankruptcy. To offset this possible loss, the investor buys a bond with unit nominal value at a discounted price p ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, as in [7] , the total debt evolves according toẊ
where U (t) is the rate of payments that the borrower chooses to make to the lenders at time t. By Itō's formula, one derives the stochastic evolution of the debt-to-income ratio
is the portion of the total income allocated to reduce the debt.
In this model, we assume there exists a threshold x * > 0 beyond which bankruptcy immediately occurs. Define T x * as the time when the borrower's debt-to-income ratio first reaches x *
As in [2] , the borrower may go bankrupt at random time T B before T x * . If at time τ the borrower is not yet bankrupt and the debt-to-income ratio is x(τ ) = y, then the probability that bankruptcy will occur shortly after time τ is measured by
Here, ρ : [0, x * [→ [0, +∞[ is the instantaneous bankruptcy risk, an increasing function of x with lim x→x * − ρ(x) = +∞. Hence, the probability that the borrower is not yet bankrupt at time t > 0 is computed as
Let θ(x) be the salvage rate that determines the fraction of the outstanding capital that can be recovered by lenders if bankruptcy occurs when the debt-to-income ratio has size x. As in [3, 4, 7] , the discounted bond price is uniquely determined by the competition of a pool of risk-neutral lenders
Given an initial size x 0 of the debt-to-income ratio, the borrower wants to find a pair of optimal controls (u, v) which minimizes his total expected cost, exponentially discounted in time:
5)
where c(v) is the social cost resulting from devaluation, L(u) is the cost to the borrower for putting income towards paying the debt, and B is the cost of bankruptcy.
To complete this subsection, we introduce standard assumptions in our model. Concerning the functions θ, ρ, L and c, we shall assume 
for some constant δ 0 > 0 and v max ≥ 0.
System of Hamilton-Jacobi equations
The stochastic control system (2.1)-(2.4) is not standard. Indeed, the discount price p in (2.4) depends on the debt-to-income ratio not only at the present time t but also at all future times. Therefore, it is natural to look at this model in a feedback form. More precisely, assume that the optimal control has feedback form, so that
Definition 2.1 (Stochastic optimal feedback solution). We say that a triple of functions (u * (x), v * (x), p(x)) provides an optimal solution to the problem of optimal debt management (2.1)-(2.5) if:
(i) Given the function p(·), for every initial value x 0 ∈ [0, x * ] the feedback control (u * , v * ) with bankruptcy time T B as in (2.3) provides an optimal solution to the stochastic control problem (2.5), with dynamics (2.1).
(ii) Given the feedback control (u * (·), v * (·)), the discounted price p satisfies (2.4), where T B is the bankruptcy time (2.3) determined by the dynamics (2.1).
Let us introduce the associated Hamiltonian function to (2.1)-(2.4)
Under the assumption (A3), a direct computation yields
Assume that the discount bond price, p(·) is given. The value function
solves the following second-order ODE
with boundary values
The optimality condition and (2.8) imply that the feedback strategies are recovered by
On the other hand, suppose that a pair of optimal feedback controls (u * , v * ) is known. The Feynman-Kac formula [9] implies that the discounted bond price p is the solution to secondorder ODE
with p(0) = 1 and p(x * ) = θ(x * ). Therefore, finding an optimal solution to the problem of optimal debt management (2.1)-(2.5) leads to the following system of second order implicit ODEs
11)
with boundary conditions
To complete this subsection, let us collect some useful properties of Hamiltonian H. 
where the functionsũ,ṽ are defined in (2.8) . Furthermore, 
where the constant θ min > 0 is defined in (3.1) and
Proof. By Lemma 2.2 we compute an upper bound
providing an uniform bound on H with respect to x and p. A similar analysis and application of Lemma 2.2 provides the uniform bound on H ξ .
Optimal feedback solutions
In this section, we will construct a solution of the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations (2.11) with boundary conditions (2.12) for a given bankruptcy threshold x * . In turn, this result yields the existence of optimal feedback controls for the problem of debt management (2.1)-(2.5). Finally, we show how the bankruptcy risk affects the behavior of the optimal feedback control as the debt-to-income ratio tends to x * .
Existence results for system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations
Before stating our main result, let us introduce the constant which will be a lower bound of the discount bond price p,
Under the standard assumptions (A1) -(A3), the system of second order ODEs (2.11) with boundary conditions (2.12) admits a solution (V, p)
for a constant M * which can be explicitly computed .
It is well-known (see [5, Theorem 4.1] or [8, Theorem 11.2.2]) that having constructed a solution (V, p) to the boundary value problem (2.11)-(2.12), then (u * , v * ) in (2.9)-(2.10) is an optimal solution to the problem of optimal debt management (2.1)-(2.5). As a consequence of Theorem 3.1, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 3.1. Under the same assumptions of Theorem 3.1, the debt management problem (2.1)-(2.5) admits an optimal control strategy in feedback form. Moreover, there exists a threshold such that the optimal control strategy does not use currency devaluation for values below that threshold.
Toward the proof of Theorem 3.1, we introduce a system of second order implicit ODEs which approximates (2.11). More precisely, for any given ε > 0, let ρ ε be a monotone increasing Lipschitz function on [0, x * ] defined by
Consider the following system of implicit ODEs
where the functionṽ
From the assumption (A3), one can easily get that
We establish an existence result for (3.4) with boundary condition (2.12) by considering the auxiliary parabolic system whose steady states will provide a solution to (3.4) . Following [1] , we shall construct a compact, convex and positively invariant set of functions 1] . A topological technique will then yield the existence of solutions (V ε , p ε ) of the system (3.4). 
Proof. Given a threshold of bankruptcy x * > 0, let's consider the parabolic system with the unknown V(t, x) and
with the boundary conditions It is well-known (see [1, Theorem 1] ) that the parabolic system (3.7) with initial data
for any T > 0. Adopting a semigroup notation, we denote by S t (V 0 , p 0 ) = (V(t, ·), p(t, ·)) the solution to the system (3.7) at time t with initial data (3.9).
We claim that the following closed and convex domain in
is positively invariant under the semigroup S t , namely
Indeed, as in [3] , we consider the constant functions
Recalling (2.14), one has
This implies that V + is a supersolution and V − is a subsolution of the first parabolic equation in (3.7). A standard comparison principle [10] yields
Similarly, from (A1)-(A3), (3.1) and (3.5), it holds
Thus, p + is a supersolution and p − is a subsolution of the second parabolic equation in (3.7), and this yields
Setting Differentiating the first equation in (3.4), we obtain that W solves the following ODE
one can easily see that the constant function 0 is a subsolution to (3.10). Thus, by [10] ,
yielding the monotone increasing property of V with respect to x. From the bounds in Lemma 2.2 and the invariance of D, we can apply [1, Theorem 3] to obtain the existence of a steady state solution (V ε , p ε ) ∈ D for the system (3.7) which solves (3.4) and (2.12) such that V ε is monotone increasing.
In order to obtain a solution to (2.11) from (3.4) by passing ε to 0+, we derive some a priori estimates on the derivatives of (V ε , p ε ). 
11)
where the constant M * is explicitly computed by
with K 1 defined in (2.16), and
Moreover, for any δ ∈]0, x * /2[, there exists a constant M δ > 0 such that 
From the definition of ρ ε in (3.3), one has
14)
and (A2) implies that
x * ] is obtained at
Let us establish an upper bound of
, by the mean value theorem, there exists a point x 2 ∈]x 1 , 3 4 x * [ such that
From the first equation of (3.4) we have
Two cases are considered:
• For any x ∈ [x 1 , x 2 ], from (3.14), (A2), and the above equality we have
where the last inequality holds because
where the constant K 1 is defined in (2.16). Thus, applying Grönwall's inequality in the interval [x,
Recalling (3.15) we obtain that
and Grönwall's inequality implies that
Thus, (3.15) yields
(3.18) Therefore, combining (3.12), (3.17), (3.18) and (3.5), we obtain (3.11).
2.
For any fixed 0 < δ < x * 2 , we will provide uniform bounds on 
Similarly, from the second equation in (3.4) , it holds that
By the mean value theorem, there exists a point
Applying Grönwall's inequality to (3.20) in the intervals [δ,
for some constant K δ depending only on δ. Thus, from (3.20) we get
Combining the two above estimates and (3.19), we obtain (3.13) with the constant
This completes the proof.
We are ready to prove our first main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. The proof is divided into three steps:
Step 1. For any 0 < ε < 1/2 sufficiently small, let (V ε , p ε ) be a solution to (3.4) Step 2. It remains to check the boundary condition (2.12) for p. Let us first show that
Given ε ∈]0, 1 2 [, we construct a lower bound p − of p ε independent of ε in a neighborhood of 0. From (A1), there exists M > 0 such that
(3.22)
Note that p − (0) = 1 ≤ p ε (0). By choice of k andx 0 , we have
and from (3.22), it holds for all x ∈ [0,x 0 ] that
We claim that p − is a sub-solution of the second equation in (3.4) in the interval [0,x 0 ]. Indeed, recalling (3.11) that v ε (x) ≡ 0 on the region x ∈ [0,x 0 ], from Lemma 2.2 (i) and (3.23), one estimates
for all x ∈ [0,x 0 ]. In turn, we have
24)
and this yields (3.21).
Step 3. To complete the proof, we prove that
Given ε ∈ ]0, 1/2[ sufficiently small, we will provide an upper bound on the L ∞ distance of p ε and θ over [x * − δ, x * ] denoted by
For a fixed 0 < δ < x * 4 , the continuity of p ε and θ implies that
Since p ε (0) = θ(0) = 1 and p ε (x * ) = θ(x * ), we can define two points
Notice that p ε − θ does not change sign in the interval ]x * 1 , x * 2 [. For simplicity, let us introduce the following function
It is clear that
x * 2 , we then have
27)
where K 1 is defined in (2.16). Two cases may occur:
. Thus, by mean value theorem there existsx ∈ x m − δ, x m such that
Let g be solution to the ODE
Solving the above equation, one gets
for all x ≥x. In particular, it holds that
Thus, from (3.26) it holds x * 2 and this yieldsx * 1 = x * 1 . Two subcases are considered:
With the same argument in case 1, one can show that
Thus, as in (3.28), it holds
|θ(x) − θ(y)|.
(3.30) From (3.28)-(3.30), we obtain that
for all ε ∈ 0, 1 2 , δ ∈ 0, x * 4 with the constants
In particular,
|θ(x) − θ(y)| and the uniform continuity of θ yields (3.25).
Optimal currency devaluation and payment strategy near x *
This subsection is devoted to the behavior of optimal feedback controls near the bankruptcy threshold x * . Roughly speaking, let (u * , v * , p) be an optimal solution to the problem of optimal debt management (2.1)-(2.5), and V be the corresponding value function. In addition to (3.2), we will show that when the debt-to-income ratio x closes to x *
• if the risk of bankruptcy ρ slowly approaches to infinity then the optimal strategy of borrower involves continuously devaluating its currency and making payment, i.e. u * (x) > 0 and v * (x) > 0,
• conversely, if the risk of bankruptcy ρ quickly approaches to infinity then any action to reduce the debt is not optimal, i.e. u * (x) = v * (x) = 0. 
for all x ∈]0, x * [. In addition if we assume that 
Proof. 1. For any given x 1 ∈]0, x * [ and x 2 ∈]0, x 1 [, we seek for an upper bound for V as a supersolution to the first equation of (2.11) of the form
with α > 0 satisfying the following relation
For every x ∈]0,
Similarly, for every x ∈]x 1 , x * [, one has
On the other hand, for every x ∈]x 2 , x 1 [, we compute ≤ B · −r + α · r ln x 1 x 2 + β(x 1 ) = 0.
Hence, V 1 is a supersolution of the first equation of (2.11) and
V (x) ≤ V 1 (x), for all x ∈ [0, x * ].
In particular, we have
and this implies that
r ln x 1 x 2 + β(x 1 )
.
Since the above inequality hold for every x 2 ∈]0, x 1 [, one obtains (3.32).
2.
We seek for a lower bound for V as a subsolution to the first equation of (2.11) in the interval [x 1 , x * ] of the form 
